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HARVARD LAW REVIEW

THE ALIENABILITY OF CHOSES IN ACTION

T

HE complete history of the law relating to the assignment of
choses in action remains to be written. The late James Barr
Ames gave us a portion of it in his essay upon "The Inalienability
of Choses in Action." 1 In that essay he traced for us the development of the law relating to the subject in the common law courts
of England, but not to any considerable extent its development in
the English court of equity or in American courts of law and equity.
In his essay the learned author also reached certain conclusions
concerning the present state of the law relating to the alienability,
or inalienability, of choses in action, these conclusions being based
in part upon his historical survey and in part upon an analysis of
the fundamental nature of choses in action. It is the purpose of
the present paper to follow the development of this branch of our
law from its earliest beginnings in English equity, so far as they can
be ascertained, down to the present day. An attempt will also be
made to present what is believed to be a more accurate analysis of
the nature of ownership of a chose in action. It is believed that a
wider historical survey and a more careful and thoroughgoing
analysis will throw much additional light upon the matter and aid
us in reaching a dearer understanding of the actual law now in
force in our own country.
We start, of course, with the proposition that according to the
original common law rule, which had a few exceptions enumerated
by Mr. Ames, a chose in action was not assignable. At the outset
let us first of all ask ourselves just what it is that the common law
refuses to recognize as assignable. Perhaps we cannot do better
than to take as the starting point of our discussion passages from
the essay already referred to. The learned writer says:
"The rule (that a chose in action is not assignable) is ...believed to
be a principle of universal law. A right of action in one person implies
a corresponding duty in another to perform an agreement or to make
1
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reparation for a tort. That is to say, a chose in action always presupposes
a personal relation between two individuals. But a personal relation in
the very nature of things cannot be assigned. Even a relation between
a person and a physical thing in his possession, as already stated, cannot be transferred. The thing itself may be transferred, and, by consent
of the parties to such transfer, the relation between the transferor and
the thing may be destroyed and replaced by a new but similar relation
between the transferee and the res. But where one has a mere right
against another, there is nothing that is capable of transfer. The duty
of B. to A., whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto, may of course be
extinguished and replaced by a new and coextensive duty of B. to C.
But this substitution of duties can be accomplished only in two ways:
either by the consent of B., or without his consent, by an act of sovereignty. The exceptions already mentioned of assignments by or to
the king, and conveyances of remainders and reversions in the King's
Court, are illustrations of the exercise of sovereign power. Further
illustrations are found in the bankruptcy laws which enable the assignee
to realize the bankrupt's choses in action, and in the Statute 4 and 5
Anne, c. 16, which abolished the necessity of attornment."
To the mind of the present writer, the analysis of the nature of
a chose in action here presented by the learned author is inadequate
and possibly even misleading. To begin with, the word "transfer"
is used 'in two senses in the passage quoted. When the transfer of
the physical thing is spoken of, what is meant is merely the physical
delivery of custody; when the transfer of legal rights is referred to,
what is meant is of course something quite different. Upon analysis,
as the learned author himself states, it seems very clear that no
rights are, strictly speaking, transferable. What happens, for example, upon a so-called transfer of title to real property from A. to
B. is, that the rights and other jural relations of A. in relation to
his fellowmen with respect to the object transferred are extinguished or divested and that B. becomes invested with similar
though not necessarily identical rights and other jural relations.
Whether in a given case A. and B., either singly or acting in cooperation, can do acts to which the law attaches such legal consequences seems to be purely a question of positive law. In this respect it does not seem possible to recognize that the transfer or
assignment of a chose in action involves anything fundamentally
different from what is involved in a transfer of a chose in possession.
A. has a certain chose in action, say a claim for $ioo, based upon a
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common law debt, against X. Can A. and B., without X.'s consent,
do acts to which the law will attach the legal consequences that
A.'s claim against X. will be divested and B. be invested with a
similar claim against X.? It seems clear that to this question no
answer based upon a priorireasoning can be given; it also is purely
a question of positive law.
Just what the learned author from whom we have quoted meant
by the statement that the rule that a chose in action is not assignable "is a principle of universal law" the present writer has never
been able to decide. If all that is meant is that it seems to be the
original view of both the Roman law and the common law, it is
true; but if it means that the rule is a necessary one, one that must
exist in all systems of law, it seems to be erroneous except in the
sense that all legal rights are from their nature not, in the strictest
sense, transferable. Thus interpreted, however, the statement,
while true, is of little value, for we can say with equal truth that it
is a principle of universal law that property rights of all kinds are
not transferable. It has seemed worth while to discuss this passage
in the essay referred to for the reason that some at least of Dean
Ames's students seem to have assumed that he meant by it the
erroneous proposition that there"is some universally necessary and
absolute principle of universal law - one that from the nature of
things must exist in all systems of law - which renders the transfer
of a chose in action impossible but does not prevent the transfer of
other legal rights. For example, one of them says;
"Dean Ames ha shown, that while the title to a corporeal thing is
transferable, the title to a chose in action, which is an incorporeal thing,
is incapable of transfer. Consequently, the purchaser of a corporeal
trust res - a legal or equitable chose in action - whatever else he ac2
quires, acquires no title."

2 Thaddeus D. Kenneson, 23 YALE L. J. [94. Mr. Kenneson uses the supposed
principle that a chose in action is "incapable of transfer," by which he seems to mean
incapable because of its nature, as a premise to a series of arguments which seek to
demonstrate the incorrectness of Mr. Ames's conclusions as to the law relating to bond
fide purchasers for value. By assuming the further premises that equitable interests
are choses in action (in which he seems to follow Mr. Ames), he apparently reaches the
conclusion that they are not transferable. As the contrary has been the law for a long
time, it is obvious that there is a flaw somewhere, and clearly it is found in the premises,
both of which seem to the present writer erroneous. Whether the conclusions in regard to the doctrine of bondfide purchaser for value as applied to the transfer of equitable interests which the learned writer draws from his argument are sound or not is
another question and one which cannot be discussed here.
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Let us return to our question, What is this chose that at common
law cannot be assigned? What is it that one who "owns" or "has
title to" a chose in action really has that he cannot transfer or
assign? Upon analysis it turns out to be a much more complex
thing than seems to have been supposed. Let us begin with a
concrete example of a chose in action of some kind - say the common law debt for $ioo previously referred to, A. being the creditor
and X. the debtor. What jural relations go to make up that complex of jural relations - the debt? In the first place - and this
is about the only thing that usually is thought of- A. is said to
have a right in personan against X.; X. is said to be under a duty
to A. to pay him the $ioo when it is due. Another way of stating
this is, that if X. does not pay the money when due, A. will acquire
a cause of action of a certain kind - debt or indebitatus assumpsit
in the case supposed - and can, by taking the appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment against X. and enforce it by the usual
means. A little reflection, however, shows us that this by no means
constitutes the whole of "ownership" of or "title" to the debt.
One who owns such a chose has also what some of us, especially
those who are engaged in the teaching of law, are coming to call
"legal powers." The owner of the debt can, for example, do acts
which will bring about the extinguishment of the debt. One way
is by executing and delivering a release under seal; another is by
accepting payment, or something other than money by way of accord and satisfaction. By suing on the debt and reducing it to
judgment, the creditor can bring it about that the original debt is
extinguished and its place taken by a new obligation, a debt of
record. The legal ability to accomplish any one of these or similar
results is aptly called a legal "power." 3 Let us note in passing that
the rule of the old common law that we are discussing denies to the
owner of a chose in action a legal power which owners of other kinds
of property usually have, viz., to do acts which will both divest the
creditor's right in personam against the debtor and invest an assignee with a similar right.
See the valuable article by Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld of Yale University on
"Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions" in 23 YALE L. J. I6. The fundamental concepts used in this article are the ones there set forth, and the learned reader is referred
to Mr. Hohfeld's discussion for their further elucidation. And see Dean Roscoe Pound's
article on "Legal Rights," in 26 INT. JOURN. OF ETmcS, 92. Compare also "mey,
LEADING PINcrPiEs OF ANGLO-AmERICAN LAW, §§ 113-29; also the pre~ent writer's
discussion in 15 COL. L. REv. 40-44. •
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Continuing our analysis of the concept of ownership of a chose in
action, we find farther that if one is completely the owner of a chose
in action he may, without committing any legal wrong against anyone, exercise these various powers, i.e., he is under no duty to others
to refrain from exercising them, or, as we say, other people have no
right that he shall not exercise them. This absence of duty to refrain from doing certain things some of us are getting into the habit
of calling a legal "privilege," borrowing the term from the law of
evidence, where we speak of the "privilege" of a witness not to
testify, meaning thereby that he is under no duty to testify. Applying this to the ownership of a chose in action, we may say that in
addition to the rights and powers described, the owner of the chose in
action has certain legal privileges - to release the chose, accept payment, or enter in agreements of accord and satisfaction, etc.
A thoroughgoing analysis of the concept of ownership of a chose
in action requires us to add one more element to those already mentioned. Complete ownership of any chose, whether in action or in,
possession, includes also the absence of legal powers on the part of
other persons to do many of the things which the owner of the chose
has the legal power to do. This we may express by saying that the
owner of a chose in action possesses certain legal "immunities"
from the power of other persons to do acts which will, for example,
release or otherwise extinguish the rights above described. To sum
up: We may say that the complete ownership of a chose in action
is an aggregate of legal rights, privileges, powers and immunities of
the kinds described. 4 Our real problem, therefore, is this: Can the
owner of a chose in action, either singly or in cobperation with a
third person, the assignee, but without the consent of the one against
whom the chose in action exists, do acts to which the law will attach
the consequences that this aggregate of rights and other jural relations will be divested and the assignee become invested with a
similar aggregate? In other words, does ownership of a chose in
action include a legal power as well as a legal privilege to bring about
such a result? As already stated, originally at common law it certainly did not. It is, however, the contention of the present writer
4 The analysis in the text does not include the jural relations growing out of the
chose in action which exists between the owner of the chose and persons other than
the one immediately bound. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 2z6 (1853), and similar cases
show that such jural relations exist.
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that a careful survey of the historical development- of the law, especially in this country, will show that the common law, by a gradual
process of judicial legislation, stimulated no doubt by developments
which went on in equity, and aided in some jurisdictions by statutes,
reached the final result of making choses in action really alienable;
and that statutes permitting the assignee to sue in his own name
merely change the label of the action and not the substantive law.
The contention, in other words, is, that the assignor really ceased
to be regarded in any way as the owner of the chose in action, except for the purpose of lending his name to the title of the suit.
With the foregoing analysis as our guide, let us test this theory
by examining the historical development of the law upon the subject. As might be supposed, we must begin with equity. Since
Dean Ames wrote his essay, we have learned much concerning
what went on in chancery during the early days. For this we are,
with reference to our topic, especially indebted to the investigations of the chancery petitions during the fifteenth century, recently made by Mr. W. T. Barbour. With reference to the assignment of debts, Mr. Barbour says that "among the earliest petitions
(in chancery) preserved we find assignees seeking to recover in
their own names debts which had been assigned to them." - It is
not possible to say certainly whether at this time any consideration was required, though apparently it was not; but that assignments were enforced in equity seems clear. In any event, we know
from later cases that it became the settled doctrine that the assignee,
at least where there was a consideration, and perhaps where there
was none, could recover from the debtor by bill in equity brought
in the name of the assignee.6 It is important to notice that the chancellor regarded the debtor after notice of the assignment as owing
S"The History of Contract in Early English Equity," by W. T. Barbour, in 4Oxronn Simuis iN SocIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY, edited by Paul Vinogradoff, p. io8.
6 Some of the early cases in equity are: Perryer v. Hallifax, Rep. temp. Finch, 299

(1677); Fashion v. Atwood, 2 Ch. Cas. 36 (i68o); Peters v. Soame, 2 Vern. 428 (1701);
Anonymous, 2 Freem. Ch. 144 (1675); Atkins v. Dawbury, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 88 (1714);
Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. W. igg (7,33); Row v. Dawson, i Ves. 331 (x749).
There is confusion in the cases as to the necessity for consideration. It seems probable that originally it was not necessary, but that ideas as to maintenance, etc., led to a
change of view. The resulting confusion in the authorities has left its traces in modem
law. The subject is discussed by Mr. Edward Jenks, Sir W. R. Anson, and Professor
George P. Costigan, Jr., in the LAw QuART. REV., vol. 16, p. 241; vOl. 17, p. 90;
and vol. 27, P. 326.
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the debt directly to the assignee. The common law, however, continued for a considerable period to deny any validity whatever to
an attempted assignment, having by this time developed the idea
that the power of attorney, by which it was sought to evade the
common law prohibition against assignment, unduly stimulated
litigation and so was prohibited by the statutes against maintenance. 7 It thus appears that there was a period in the history of
English law during which the assignee acquired by the assignment
no legal rights of any kind, but did acquire equitable rights against
the one liable on the chose in action. The aggregate of common law
rights and other jural relations composing ownership of the chose
in action remained vested completely in the assignor, just as they
do in the case of a typical trust; but the chancellor gave to the assignment the effect of creating in equity a new aggregate of rights
and other jural relations. This aggregate of equitable jural relations included, in addition to the rights against the debtor, also a
right that the assignor should refrain from exercising the privileges
and powers which the common law still ascribed to him. A complete analysis would of course show that the assignee also possessed
certain equitable privileges, powers, and immunities. This state of
the law explains the origin of the familiar statement, true at the
period of which we speak, but long since outgrown, that "a chose
in action is assignable in equity but not at law."
The common law lawyers and judges, no doubt stimulated by
this development in chancery, began to try to find some method of
evading their rule against assignability. Down to a certain point,
Mr. Ames has accurately described what happened on the common
law side. By gradually changing their views concerning the Megality of assignments because of maintenance, the common law
lawyers were able, through the device of the "power of attorney"
already referred to, to enable the assignee to obtain relief in common
law proceedings by suing in the name of the assignor. At first an
express power of attorney was required, but later one was implied.8
7"AmEs, LTcTUREs ON LEGAL ISTORY, p. 213.
s Ams, loc. Cit., p. 214, note i.

Apparently Dean Ames thought of the power of

attorney as "implied in fact," for he speaks of it as "implied from circumstantial evi-

dence." But was any evidence beyond the "assignment" itself necessary in the fully
developed doctrine? It would seem that the "power of attorney" was "implied in
law," i. e., was attached by the law to each assignment as a legal consequence of the
same, irrespective of any implied intention in fact.
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Originally, of course, the theory was that the assignee sued as the
agent or attorney of the assignor, although entitled to appropriate
the proceeds to his own use; and it seems to be the contention of
Mr. Ames, or at least of some who follow his theory, that this has
ever since remained the law. 9 As has already been indicated, it is
the belief of the present writer that a consideration of the cases,
especially those in this country, will show that any such view is
not warranted by the cases.
Perhaps before going farther it may be well to note what is really
involved in the theory that the assignee is really in some sense the
agent or attorney of the assignor in collecting the chose or in suing
upon it. If the assignee is an agent and the assignor is still the
owner of the chose, it would seem to follow that the assignor must
retain the common law powers mentioned above. He must have,
for example, the power to give a valid release, accept payment or
accord and satisfaction, control the suit if brought in the common
law court in his name, enter satisfaction of the judgment, control
the issue of execution on it, etc., etc. Doubtless, as soon as the
legality of the "power of attorney" is recognized, he is under a
duty not to do these things, i.e., he has lost some of his common law
"privileges," so that he will incur a legal liability in damages for
breaking his duty to the assignee not to do these acts except for
the benefit of the assignee.' 0 Absence of privilege, however, does
9 AmEs, op. Cit., p. 214, note 3; Kenneson, oc. cit. In the note referred to, Dean
Ames contends that the bailor's interest in the chattel bailed is a chose in action and
"upon principle and by the old precedents no more transferable than that of a creditor."
He admits that the old precedents are no longer the law, so far as the decisions of the
cases go, and it is difficult to see what the "principle" which forbids the transfer is,
except ihe supposed "principle of universal law" previously referred to. It seems
also that even if we admit the validity of such a principle, the assertion as to the bailor's
interest is incorrect. The bailor has a true right in rem against "all the world" that
they shall refrain from dealing with the chattel without authority, and may sue third
persons unlawfully dealing with the chattel while in the bailee's possession, bringing
trover or case, according to the circumstances. Cf. my discussion of similar questions
in i5 COL. L. REv. 46; also the recent articles in the HAnv. L. Rxv. for February and
March, i916, by Professor Percy Bordwell of Iowa.
The present writer is convinced that some of Dean Ames's students misinterpret
Mr. Ames's real meaning when he says that the assignee held only a "power of attorney." He says (I CASES ON TRUSTS, 2 ed., p. 6i) that it was apower "for the attorney's own benefit," which, of course, is inconsistent with its being merely an agency,
as, for example, Mr. Kenneson seems to assume.
10It should be emphasized that the assignor is no longer complete owner of the
chose in action if he has ceased to have all the privileges of an owner, i. e., if, not as a
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not mean absence of legal power, and so long as the theory of agency
is followed, the extent of the assignee's rights in a court of law would
be measured by an action for damages, and he would be powerless
to prevent the breach of duty on the part of the assignor. If he
wished preventive relief, it would be necessary for him to resort to
equity, with its power to issue injunctions and its theory that the
assignee ought to be regarded as the owner and protected accordingly.
For a time after the legality of the "power of attorney" came to
be recognized it is undoubtedly true that the assignee had no greater
rights in a court of law than have just been described; but the common law could not and did not remain in this condition. Traces of
a farther evolution begin to appear at a relatively early date. In
a case in the King's Bench in 1676 (Carringtonv. Harway, i Keble
8o3), it appeared that the plaintiff, who was resident in Spain, had
executed a letter of attorney to acknowledge satisfaction of a judgment which he held against the defendant. Counsel prayed that
satisfaction might be acknowledged by the attorney's name in the
letter, but the court refused, the plaintiff "having before assigned
it [the judgment] over to one Cocke, which, being in satisfaction
of just debt, is not revocable." The effect of a decision of this kind,
of course, is to deprive the assignor of one of his common law powers,
for dearly the real owner of a judgment could do what the plaintiff
had attempted. Again in Lilly's Practical Register11 we find the
statement that the death of the assignor does not revoke the socalled power of attorney, but that the assignee may sue in the name
of the assignor's administrator even without the latter's consent.
Clearly the old theory is giving way, so far as results are concerned,
although the courts still say that the assignment "does not vest an
2
interest" in the assignee. In 1799, in the case of Legh v. Legh,'
the Court of Common Pleas was confronted with this situation:
the assignor of a bond, after the assignee had begun suit in the name
of the assignor, accepted payment from the debtor who had notice
of the assignment, and also executed a release, which release was
mere matter of contract, but because of an interest in the chose which is beginning to be
ascribed to the assignee, he is regarded as under a duty to the assignee to refrain from
exercising his common law powers. He no more has complete ownership than has the

owner of the servient tenement in the case of an easement.
n LrLLY's PRACTICAL REGISTER, 2 ed. (1735), p. 324.
2 i Bos. & Pul. 447.
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pleaded as a defense by the debtor when sued by the assignee in
the name of the assignor. On the theory that the assignor at law
still owned the bond, this plea stated a complete defense to the
action and the assignee's only remedy would be an action for damages against the assignor or by bill in equity for cancellation of the
release. However, the counsel for the real plaintiff, the assignee,
obtained a rule nisi for setting aside the plea and ordering the
release to be canceled. The following extracts from the original
report are worthy of quotation:
"Eyre, Ch. J. The conduct of this Defendant has been against good
faith, and the only question is, whether the Plaintiff must not seek relief
in a Court of Equity? The Defendant ought either to have paid the
person to whom the bond was assigned, or have waited till an action
was commenced against him, and then have applied to the Court.
Most dearly it was in breach of good faith to pay the money to the assignor of the bond and take a release, and I rather think the Court ought
not to allow the Defendant to avail himself of this plea, since a Court
of Equity would order the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the amount of
his lien on the bond, and probably all the costs of the application."
"Buller, J. There are many cases in which the Court has set aside a
release given to prejudice the real Plaintiff. All these cases depend on
circumstances. If the release be fraudulent, the Court will attend to
the application.
"The Court recommended the parties to go before the prothonotary,
in order to ascertain what sum was really due to the Plaintiff on the
bond.
"Shepherd on this day stated that the Defendant objected to going
before the prothonotary, upon which the Court said, that the rule must
be made absolute. He then applied for leave to plead payment of the
bond, and contended that as this was not an application under the
statute to plead several pleas, the Court had no discretion.
"Eyre, Ch. J. The Court has in many cases refused to allow a party
to take his legal advantage, where it has appeared to be against good
faith. Thus we prevent a man from signing judgment who has a right
by law to do so, if it would be in breach of his own agreement. In order
to defeat the real Plaintiff,this Defendant has colluded with the nominal
Plaintiffto obtain a release; and I think therefore the plea of release may
be set aside consistently with the general rules of the Court (Vide Donholly v. Dunn, 2 B. & P. 45). And if so, the Defendant cannot be permitted to plead payment of the bond, as that would amount to the
same thing.
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"Buller, J. The Court proceeds on the ground, that the Defendant
has in effect agreed not to plead payment against the nominal obligee.
"Upon this the Defendant consented to go before the prothonotary." 13
We have now reached the time when America separated from
the mother country and we must therefore transfer our attention
from English to American cases, for in this, as in so many other
branches of our law, the so-called "common law" is received not
as a completed system but as a growing organism whose further
development under new and different surroundings is not necessarily the same as in the old home. The earliest American case
worthy of notice which the present writer has found is one decided
in 1772.14 In that case (Bildad Fowler v. John Harmon, reported
in the opinion in another case) the Superior Court of New Haven
County, Connecticut, had the issue placed squarely before it. The
plaintiff, who had brought an action of trover, proved that he was
assignee of a note payable in grain, the place of payment being the
house of the promisor; that the promisor tendered the grain there;
that it remained there for some time, as no one was there to receive
it when tendered; that the defendant, a constable, under a judgment and execution against the assignor, attached the grain as the
property of the assignor and took it away. Verdict and judgment
were for the plaintiff, "for by the assignment of the note, the property of the grain upon the tender, vested in the assignee." Clearly
here is no theory of agency, for, be it noted, the assignee had never
dealt with the grain in any way. On the theory pursued by the
writer in the Yale Law Journal previously quoted, the grain when
tendered first becomes the property of the assignor, and passes to
the assignee only when he appropriates it under an authority given
him by the assignor to do so. On the agency theory the title to the
grain vested in the assignor, and as the assignee never appropriated
the grain or had anything to do with it, the plaintiff's trover action
would fail. As we have seen, the court held just the contrary, viz.,
that the property vested directly in the assignee.
In the same state, in a case in 1794, where the debtor had taken
a release after notice of the assignment, we find the Supreme Court
13Cf. similar action in personam by law courts in Payne v. Rogers, i Doug. 407
(1780); Doe dent. Lock v. Franklin, 7 Taunt. 9 (186); Hickey v. Burt, 7 Taunt. 48
(186); Mountstephen v. Brooke, i Chitty 390 (18ig).
14 The case is reported in the case of Redfield v. Hilhouse, i Root (Conn.) 63 (z774).
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saying to an assignee who had sued the promisor in equity, that
probably now the assignee could get adequate relief at law without
coming to equity, but that this time they will allow equitable relief as they have done in the past. 5 Three years later, on similar
facts a court of the same state denied equitable relief on the sole
ground that the assignee had a complete and adequate remedy at
law.16 This remedy at law seems in Connecticut to have been by
tort action against the original debtor or against the assignor.. Apparently the Connecticut court at this time had not reached the
conception of Legh v. Legh, that the release could be treated as a
nullity by a common law court, and of course the English case was
not decided until 1799. In another early case, this time in Pennsylvania, a common law court in 1785 refused to recognize a power
of attorney given by the nominal plaintiff authorizing a dismissal
of the suit, where it appeared that there had been an assignment for
a valuable consideration. 7 This of course is in principle the same
as the English case of Carringtonv. Harway previously referred to.
In several of the states the development begun by the English
cases was pushed to its logical conclusion. In New York especially,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Kent, the development was
very rapid. In i8oo the New York Supreme Court decided the
case of Andrews v. Beecker.'5 That was an action of debt on a bond.
To a plea of release the plaintiff replied that prior to the release he
assigned the bond to a third person, of which the defendant had
notice. On demurrer the replication was held good, the court
saying, "A release after the assignment of the bond and notice to
the defendant, is a nullity and ought not to be regarded." The
logical inconsistency of such a replication does not seem to trouble
the court, but it is certainly perplexing to be told that the nominal
plaintiff owns the chose, and the assignee does not;, but that a release by the alleged owner, theoretically the plaintiff, is a legal
nullity. Following our analysis, we recognize that, to use a some15Russel v. Cornwell, 2 Root (Conn.)

122 (1794).
16Booth v. Warner (1797), reported in Coleman v. Wolcott, 4 Day (Conn.) 6, i8

(1809).
17 M'CuUum v. Coxe, r Dall. 139 (1785). The Chief Justice suggested that the
assignee's name and the fact that the suit is for his benefit should be put on the mar-

gin of the record, so as to give notice of the real situation, stating that this was the
practice when he was at the bar.
is i Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 4M1.
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what homely figure of speech, one of the sticks in the bundle of
jural relations which go to make up ownership in the assignor is
now actually missing, viz., the common law power to extinguish
the chose by a release under seal. Not only is it a legal wrong for
the assignor to do this - he no longer has the legal power to do it.
In the following year (i8oi) the same court decided another case
in which they took a similar step. The assignor of a judgment
had wrongfully entered satisfaction. This was on motion ordered
vacated, the court-saying:
"The assignee of the judgment is to be recognized by this court, as
the owner, and all acts of the plaintiff (assignor) subsequent to the assignment, and affecting the validity of the judgment were fraudulent.
He has no more power over the judgment than a stranger." 19
In the case of Littlefield v. Storey, decided by the same court in 18o8,20
to a plea of payment the replication was, that prior to the payment
the obligation had been assigned, that the defendant had notice of
the assignment, and that the action was commenced for the sole
use of the assignee. On demurrer, the replication was held good,
and so another common law power of the assignor vanished. After
notice of the assignment to the debtor the alleged owner of the
chose in action no longer had the power to bring about its extinguishment by accepting payment.
The New York court seems to have carried to its logical conclusion its doctrine that after notice to the debtor the assignee in
a court of law is to be treated as the owner for all purposes, with
the one exception that in the title of the action the name of the
assignor must be used. Perhaps the most extreme example, and
one not followed by all courts, is found in the case of Dawson v.
Coles, decided in 1819.21 The court went so far in that case as to
hold that a plea of previous recovery by the plaintiff was satisfactorily answered, by way of confession and avoidance, by a replication which set out the assignment, notice to the debtor, and
that the previous suit and recovery were brought by the plaintiffassignor, for his own use, of which the defendant had notice. This
so clearly denies ownership to the assignor and ascribes it to the
assignee that it seems hardly worth while to do more than make
10 Wardell v. Eden, 2 Johns. Cas. 258 (18oi).
20 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 425.
21

16 Johns. (N. Y.) 5r.
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that assertion. If the real owner of a chose in action sue upon it
and recover judgment, the chose in action is gone, being merged in
the judgment. A theory that the assignee was the agent of the
assignor would require us to hold in the case just cited that the
original claim was gone, but that the assignee had some kind of a
claim to the resulting judgment. In fact, as suggested, the older
theory of our law prevented all courts from following the view of
the New York court.22
From this time on there is, however, little uncertainty in the
vast majority of the cases, and the new doctrine is by most of the
courts applied with reasonable consistency, if such a word can fairly
be used in connection with a doctrine which begins by ascribing
ownership to one man and ends by denying it to him and ascribing
it to another. As has already been said, and as was to be expected
with so complicated and anomalous a doctrine, there were at times
in some states cases which did not go to the limit established by the
New York decisions. We can of course in a survey of the kind we
are making deal only with the generally prevailing views and not
with all local variations in matters of detail. The following extracts are, it is believed, typical, in spite of occasionally dissenting
voices:
"Although, as a general principle, a chose in action or a right in one
to sue another to recover money or property in a court of law is not
assignable, so as to enable the assignee to sue in his own name, yet it
has long been settled by repeated decisions, not now to be doubted, that
the law will protect the equitable interest of an assignee for a valuable
consideration, and that the promisor shall not be permitted to avail
himself of any payments made to the promisee subsequent to his having notice of the assignment, and that any release made to him by the
promisee, after such notice, would be a fraud upon the assignee, and
would not defeat an action brought for his benefit in the name of the
assignor. . . . The assignee is to be recognized as the owner, and all
acts of the assignor subsequent to the assignment, and affecting the
validity of the contract, are fraudulent. He has no more power over it,
than a stranger;but until the promisor has notice of the assignment all
payments made by him, and all acts of the promisee in respect to him,
are good." 2
See note 32, infra.
J., in Hackett v. Martin, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 77, 78 (1831). The italics are the
present writer's.
22

21 Parris,
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"I speak not of chancery, merely; it is the same at law. There is no
hostility between the different jurisdictions on this subject. It is a well
settled principle of common law in Connecticut,that the property in a chose
in action, may be assigned; and the courts of law have long since recognized
the property in the assignee as fully as courtsof chancery. The last feature,
which remained for some time, to distinguish the two jurisdictions, was
that of resorting to a court of chancery for redress against an obligor,
who had received a discharge from a bankrupt obligee, knowing the debt
to be assigned. But this distinguishing feature is now removed; and the
course is so well settled to bring suits at law, that I feel no hesitation in
saying, that a court of chancery would not sustain a bill of the kind.
The old form of bringing the suit on the note, in the name of the obligee, is,
indeed, continued; but it is now mere form." 24

Without attempting to state and discuss in detail individual
cases, let us run briefly over some of the main results of the new

doctrine. In each case it will be assumed, unless the contrary is
stated, that notice of the assignment has been given to the debtor.
i. Payment to the assignor or a release by him does not discharge
the obligation.2s
2. An accord and satisfaction entered into and carried out between the assignor and a debtor who has notice is invalid2s In
the case of the assignment of a contract right before breach, instead of a debt or cause of action, any conditions precedent may be
2A Smith, J., in Colboum v. Rossiter, 2 Conn. 5o3, 5o8 (i818). The italics are the
present writer's.
2 Payment no defense at law. Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 304 (i86); Anderson v.
Miller, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 586 (1846); Clark v. Rogers, 2 Greenl. (Me.) r43 (1822);
Hackett v. Martin, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 77 (1831); Littlefield v. Storey, 3 Johns. (N. Y.)
425 (i888).
Release no defense at law. Legh v.Legh, z Bos. & Pul. 447 (1779); Dunn v. Snell,
r5 Mass. 481 (I8i9); Duncklee v.Greenfied Steam Mill Co., 23 N. H. 245 (1851); Andrews v. Beecker, i Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 411 (i8oo); Wardell v.Eden, 2 Johns. Cas.
(N. Y.) 121 (i8oi); Martin v.Hawks, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 405 (188); Briggs v.Dorr,
19 Johns. (N. Y.) 95 (1821); Wheeler v.Wheeler, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 34 (1828); Hackett v.
Martin, supra. Attention is call-d to the fact that no attempt at exhaustive citation
has been made in any of the notes to the present paper. It is believed that the cases
cited are typical and represent the general trend of the authorities. The earlier cases
which settled the law have so far as possible been selected for citation. If there are
dissenting voices upon any points, the attempt is made to call attention to the fact by
citation of typical cases.
26 Jenkins v.Brewster, 14 Mass. 291 (1817); Eels v.Finch, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) z93
(x8og).
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performed by the assignee; and conversely, tender should be made
2
to the assignee.
3. Within the meaning of statutes relating to execution, the
assignee is the execution creditor, in spite of the fact that the judgment nominally stands in the name of the assignor. 28 So also the
assignee is the creditor within the meaning of an insolvency act
29
requiring notice to creditors.
4. If after the assignment the assignor becomes insolvent and
bankruptcy proceedings are had, the assignee may still use the
assignor's name in suing the debtor and the bankruptcy of the
assignor is no defense to the action as it would be if the assignor
still owned the claim. The same principle is applied in similar
cases of disability of the assignor to sue for his own benefit.03
5. On the theory of ownership in the assignee, payments made to
him or releases given by him should have the effect of extinguishing
the claim, and it is so held.31
6. The judgment obtained nominally by the assignor but actually by the assignee, cannot be reached by the assignor's creditors.
This is true apparently only where the attaching creditor has notice,
either from some indication on the record or in some other way,
a result, of course, which indicates the equitable origin of the
assignee's common law rights.32 This equitable origin must never
be lost sight of if we are to understand the present state of our law.
Of course the creditor has notice to-day, where by statute the action
is brought in the assignee's name.
7. Former recovery, where the defendant knows that the suit is
27 Van Vechten v. Graves, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 403 (i8og); Traders Insurance Co. v.
Robert, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 404 (1832); Allen v. Hudson River Mutual Ins. Co., ig Barb.
(N. Y.) 442 (1854); Hamilton v. Brown, i8 Pa. St. 87 (I85).
28 Colbourn v. Rossiter, 2 Conn. 5o3 (x88).
29 Lyford v. Dunn, 32 N. H. 8i (1856).
30 Matherson v. Wilkinson, 79 Me. 159 (1887); Stone v. Hubbard, 7 Cush. (Mass.)
595 (I851); Parsons v. Woodward, 22 N. J. L. 196 (1849). Where the assignor had
ceased to exist the assignee could not of course obtain relief in a law court. In such
cases equity gave relief. Person and Marye v. Barlow, 35 Miss. 174 (i858).
3"Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 2o6 (I8IS); other cases cited in 5 AmERcAN AND ENG-

Lisa

ENCYCLoPEDIA

OF LAW

AND

PRACTICE, 948, note 14.

On all the points this

article in 5 ENC. L. & P. contains many excellent citations.
2 Willes v. Pitkin, i Root (Conn.) 47 (1764); Fobs v. Brewster, 1 Root (Conn.) 234
(1790); St. John v. Smith, i Root (Conn.) I56 (1790). If no notice, creditors of the
assignor may of course attach. Woodbridge & Co. v. Perkins, 3 Day (Conn.) 364
(1809).
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brought for the benefit of the assignor, is no defense to a suit in the
assignor's name, brought for the benefit of the assignee. This view
was apparently not accepted in all jurisdictions."
8. The assignee is not bound by "trustee process" used against
the assignor, unless made a party to the proceedings.ss
9. An assignor who collects the debt is liable to the assignee in
a common law action for money had and received." This result,
of course, does not, standing alone, prove much, as it is quite
easy to permit a quasi-contractual action of this kind even if
we consider the assignee's rights as primarily equitable and not
legal.
xo. The assignee is the only one who can control the court proceedings - dismiss the suit, etc.3"
xi. Admissions made by the assignor after the assignment are
by most of the courts held inadmissible, though upon this point
37
there is some dissent.
12. Where the instrument is in the form of a common law specialty, the assignee can recover in trover against the assignor who
has unlawfully detained the instrument, the measure of damages
" Dawson v. Coles, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 51 (x8ig). Contra, Armstrong v. Lancaster,
s Watts (Pa.) 68 (1836), 30 Am. Dec. 293 (sembl). The difficulty was to see how the
assignee could defeat the suit by the assignor. Some cases held a plea stating the facts
bad. Cage v. Foster, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 261 (1833), 26 Am. Dec. 265; Lynn v. Glidwell,
8 Yerg. (Tenn.) i (835).
These cases say that the assignee should state the facts in
the affidavit (the assignment, and that the plaintiff is not suing for the use of the
assignee), and obtain a rule to show cause why the suit should not be dismissed. Of
course to-day when the assignee sues in his own name this difficulty does not arise.
34 Page v. Thompson, 43 N. H. 373 (1861).
5 Camp v. Tompkins, 9 Conn. 545 (1833); cases cited in 5 ENc. L. & P. 951.
36 Southwick v. Hopkins, 47 Me. 362 (i86o); Sloan v. Sommers, 14 N. 3. L. 509
(1834); M'Cullum v. Coxe, I Dall. (Pa.) 15o (1785); cases cited in 5 ENC. L. & P. 975.
Apparently Connecticut did not follow this rule, although on most points her law agreed
with the other states. See remarks by Huntington, J., in Fitch v. Boardman, 12 Conn.
345 (1837).
17 Prioleau v. South Western R. Bank, 16 Ga. 582 (18SS); Hackett v. Martin, 8 Greenl.
(Me.) 77 (1832); Frear v. Evertson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 142 (1822); Vrooman v. King,
36 N. Y. 477 (I867); Halloran v. Whitcomb, 4 3 Vt. 306 (1871). Contra, Buldey v. Lan-

don, 3 Conn. 76 (i8i9). Changed by Statute of 1822. See Scripture v. Newcomb, 16
Conn. 588 (1844). •
The assignor could be a witness: Steele v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 3 Binn. (Pa.) 306 (i8 ii);
Browne v.Weir, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 401 (i8i9); North v. Turner, 9 S. &R. (Pa.) 244 (1823).
Contra, Hackett v. Martin, supra;Frear v. Evertsen, supra. Connecticut here followed
the progressive view and permitted him to be a witness. Johnson v. Blackman, ii
Con. 342 (1836).
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being the value of what would have been recovered in the suit on
the instrument 8
13. The right to control the issue and execution of process for
the enforcement of the judgment is vested in the assignee. Here it
is worth while to briefly examine at least one of the cases in detail.
In an action of debt on a judgment obtained by the assignee in
the name of the assignor, the plea was that "the plaintiffs sued out
their writ of execution and caused execution on said judgment to
be done in full satisfaction thereof, and said execution to be returned fully satisfied." Issue was taken on the plea, and at the trial
it appeared that the deputy sheriff had followed the instructions of
the assignor, to proceed against the debtor's land, and had failed
to proceed against the personal property of the debtor as the assignee had directed him to do. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the sheriff should have done as directed by the
Creal owner" and that the common law court would protect the
latter's rights.39
14. If the officer whose duty it is to carry out the execution process fails properly to discharge this duty, the result is to make him
liable to the assignee in a tort action for damages for any resulting
loss. This action is brought by the assignee directly in his own
name, as the officer owes him the duty to execute the process for
his benefit. 4°
15. Finally, one or two courts were bold enough to hold that the
use of the assignor's name was a mere form; so that while the fact
that suit was brought in the assignee's name could be objected to
on demurrer, the objection could not be taken on motion after
verdict. For example, in a New Jersey case the court said:
18 Clowes v. Hawley, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 484 (1805).
39 Baker v. Davis, 2 Fost. (22 N. H.) 27 (i85o).
40 Colbourn v. Rossiter, 2 Conn. 5o3 (1818); Page v. Thompson, 43 N.H. 373 (i86i);
State v. Herod, 6 Blackford (Ind.) 444 (1843). Originally in such actions the assignee
sued in the name of the assignor. Woodman v. Jones, 8 N. H. 344 (1836); Martin v.
Hawks, i5 Johns. (N. Y.) 405 (18S). This produced a remarkable result in the case
of Riley v.Taber, 9 Gray (Mass.) 373 (1857), where the assignee, suing in the name of
the assignor, complained of the tort committed by the sheriff in paying the money
realized from the execution over to the nominal plaintiff. Recovery was allowed for
the benefit of the assignee, but in the name of the one who received the money.
The question of costs in the suit raised many difficulties. The whole tendency was
to make the assignee liable and to exempt the assignor from liability. Canby v. Ridg-

way, EBinn. (Pa.) 496 (iSo8); Reigart v.Ellmaker, 6 S.&R. (Pa.) 44 (1820); cf. Mass.
Statute as given in Coulter v. Haynes, 146 Mass. 458, z6 N. E. ig (1888).
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"The objection that the action cannot be maintained in the name of
the present plaintiff, because the writing is a chose in action, and not
assignable at law, so that the assignee may sue in his own name, is merely
formal, and if valid, may be amended by inserting the name of Jennings
[the assignor] as nominal plaintiff, upon proper terms. . . . The court
may add formal parties . . . upon such terms as to the court may seem
fit, for the purpose of determining in the suit the real question in controversy between the parties. Washburn v. Burns, 5 Vroom i8." 41
In closing this part of the discussion, we cannot do better than
to quote the words of Mr. Justice Collins in a recent New Jersey
case:
"It is said that choses in action have always been held in this state to
be "not assignable" at law, except by statute. . . . But all that is meant
by such an expression as that quoted is that a chose in action was not
assignable so as to permit the assignee to sue in his own name in a court
of law. Subject to that restriction, even in England, from a very early
day, choses in action have been assignable in fact, and no consideration
of the prevention of maintenance has been allowed to prevail. . . . That
there was no inherent non-assignability appears from the fact that the
restriction was never imposed on an assignee of the crown." 4
Nearly everywhere to-day the assignee is permitted to sue in
his own name.43 It seems clear that a statute of this kind merely
does away with an empty formality which no longer serves any
useful purpose. The old bottles are filled with entirely new wine
and it is time to change the label.
A word must be said concerning the situation after assignment
but before notice of it to the debtor. Clearly here the assignor retains some of the powers of an owner - he can extinguish the claim
by release, accepting payment, etc. Such acts on his part, of course,
are wrongs against the assignee and render him liable to actions
for damages. Translating this into the terms of our analysis, we
may say that the assignor retains some of his legal powers but has
4' Morrow v. Inhabitants of Vernon, 35 N.J. L. 4 9 0 (872); cf. Buller, J., in Master
v. Miller, 4 Durnf. & E. 320, 34o-4i; also the recent Georgia case of Toole v. Cook,

82 S. E. 772 (1914), taking the same view.
42 Bouvier v. Baltimore & New York Ry. Co., 67 N. J. L. 28r, 293, 51 Ati. 781, 785

(19or).
41In the code states the situation is covered by the clause requiring all actions
to be brought in the name of the "real party in interest." In other states there are
usually express statutes. The statute in Illinois is in the Practice Act, i913 REVisED
STATUTES, Ch. IIO, § 18.
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lost his privileges as owner of the chose, and the assignee is as yet
only partly owner because he lacks the immunities which are essential to complete ownership. The situation may be compared to
that of a grantee of land under an unrecorded deed. In such a case
we think of the grantee as owning the land, but his title is not complete: it is subject to a power on the part of the grantor to extinguish it by a conveyance to another purchaser who buys in good
faith and complies with the recording act. Notice to the debtor
plays the same part in the assignment of the chose in action that
recording the deed does in the case of the grant of land.4
The device of suing in the name of the assignor has been of service in aiding our law to get rid of outworn rules in ways that are
not always appreciated. At common law one disseised of land
lacked the legal power to transfer title, apparently because his
situation was assimilated to that of the owner of a chose in action.4
It is not always noticed that here also in modern times a transferee
of the disseisee could sue in the name of the disseisee and so recover
possession of the land. The courts apparently applied all the rules
as to control of the action, of execution, etc., to this case, the net
practical result being that the transferee became owner actually
though not nominally. When the New York Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, with its clause requiring all actions to be
brought in the name of the real party in interest, doubt was expressed as to its effect on this situation; consequently an amendment was adopted expressly providing that in such cases the transferee should continue to sue in the name of the transferor.4 In
4 This comparison is made in Bishop v. Holcomb, io Conn. 444 (1835). Dean Ames
put great emphasis upon this power of the assignor before notice as proof that the as-

signor still owned the chose, and he is right to the extent noted in the text. Before
notice, there is complete ownership in neither assignor nor assignee.
4A=_.s, LECTU'.ES ON LEGAL HISTORY, p.

174.

4See the whole subject discussed and cases cited in Bruss ON CODE PLEADINGS,
3 ed., § 23 a. So long as the common law action of ejectment prevailed, this application of the device of the "power of attorney" led to an action in which there were
two "nominal plaintiffs" and one real "plaintiff." See Jackson v. Leggett, 7 Wend.
(N. Y.) 377 (i831), in which in one count the tenant described the demise as made by
the disseised grantor and in another as made by the grantee of the disseissee. Recovery was allowed on the first count. An interesting use of the "power of attorney"
was made in the case of Kilgour v. Gockley, 83 Ill. 109 (1876). A note secured by a
mortgage on real estate was transferred and the mortgage assigned without any conveyance of the property. Theoretically, therefore, the transferee had no title to the
property. The court held, however, that the assignment carried a power of attorney
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spite of this the New York Real Property Law of 1896 41 reenacts
the old rule that "a grant of land held adversely is void." In other
words, the old label must be preserved, no matter what the
contents of the bottle!
The device of the "power of attorney" could not be applied to
partial assignments, with the result that nearly everywhere they
are still enforceable only in equity.48 This rule seems to be a sensible one, however, as it requires all three persons concerned to be
made parties to the suit. The theory of equity apparently is that
the debtor owes in equity part to the assignee and part to the
assignor; the debtor is an equitable debtor of the assignee as well
as of the assignor.
No attempt has been made in this paper to discuss anything but
the question of alienability. Formal requisites for transfer; the
necessity of consideration; the effects of transfer (i) on defenses of
the debtor, (2) on rights of set-off, etc., (3)on equitable claims of
other persons - the so-called latent equities - are left for discussion at a later time. In closing our discussion, however, a word
must be said concerning the effects of transfer in its relation to our
problem of alienability. If it be decided, as many courts hold,
that the transferee of a common law chose in action takes subject
to "latent equities" of third persons, even if he purchase in good
faith and for value, this is not, as some have thought, 4 an argument
that legal title does not pass to the assignee. It means simply
that because of the historical origin of the doctrine, with its beginnings in equity, as well as because of certain notions of policy, the
equitable doctrine which protects bond fide purchasers for value
has not been extended to cover this form of property which became
alienable only in modem times. If by statute the legislature should
to bring actions at law in the name of the original mortgagee, and consequently that
the transferee who had got into possession could not be disturbed. The practical result was that by gaining possession under the assignment the assignee became substantially the owner of the property.
47NEw Yopx REAL PROPERTY LAW OF i896, § 225.
48AmES's CASES ON TRUSTS, 2 ed., pp. 63-64.
4- George Luther Clarke, "The Real Party in Interest Statute in Missouri," iSUniv.
of Mo. Bulletin, No. 17, pp. i8-23. No one has ever doubted that title to overdue
commercial paper may be transferred, though some courts hold that the transferee
takes subject to equities of third persons. See the cases in i AmIs, CASES ON B.rs
AND NoT.Es, p. I91 and note ., p. 892; also justice v. Stonecipher, 267 111. 448, 1o8
N. E. 722 (i915).
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repeal the doctrine of bond fide purchaser for value, it certainly
would not follow that legal titles to land and chattels would cease
to be transferable, but to such a conclusion we must come if we
follow the logic of those who argue that even to-day the assignee
of a chose in action does not acquire legal title.
Walter Wheeler Cook.
Umvxsm op CmcAco LAW ScHooI.
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